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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

22 July 1983

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Philip Hughes
Office of the Vice President

THROUGH : [redacted] 25X1
Office of General Counsel

FROM : David D. Gries
National Intelligence Officer for Narcotics

SUBJECT : Survey of Intelligence Needs of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction Centers

1. The Vice President's Office requested a survey of the intelligence needs of the Centers. The findings, based on visits to three representative Centers, are:

-- Improvements can be made in collating information received from a variety of sources.

-- A program for generating requirements would pay off during debriefings of human sources and arrested international traffickers.

-- Trend analysis should be produced from time to time.

-- A reports system is needed to pass information along to other Centers and to Washington.

-- Collection is deficient. In addition, information collected elsewhere does not always reach the Centers.

-- The Intelligence Community should offer a training package covering collation, requirements, trend analysis and a reports system.

2. Collation -- Some of the Centers are collating their available intelligence proficiently; others would benefit from help. This is largely a problem of tactical analysis of foreign intelligence -- putting two and two together and getting it into the hands of law enforcement representatives quickly. A training course that focused on reading traffic and matching different parts of the same story from different collectors would probably be the best way to proceed. Given the nature of the narcotics problem, such a course might best be taught by an analyst with experience in military analysis.

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3. The collation process depends in part on the use of special intelligence, which, given the admixture in the Centers of Intelligence Community members and Law Enforcement Community members, must first be sanitized. Although the Centers visited showed sensitivity to the sanitization problem, they will still benefit from instruction on how to accomplish it quickly. A parallel problem concerns classification: Intelligence Community representatives who are assigned to the Centers are usually experienced in dealing with classified material; Law Enforcement Community members may not be. The answer once again is sanitization.

4. Reports System -- None of the Centers currently have a way of regularly sharing information with other Centers and with the Intelligence Community. A recently instituted daily report to the Vice President's Office will fill a portion of this gap, but a standardized reports system, such as was recently accepted by DEA and Customs in Washington, would go a long way toward promoting information sharing. A training course should be devised to teach preparation of reports in standard format covering foreign intelligence obtained by the Centers. These reports should then be shared with other Centers and Washington.

5. Requirements -- Since the law enforcement component of the Centers is focused on arrest and conviction activities, debriefings of sources, suspects, and arrested international traffickers are often neglected. Accordingly, not enough is collected about changes in international trafficking patterns, new concealment devices, and foreign communications arrangements. The Centers would benefit from training in how to prepare requirements for use with such sources in cases where the sources are prepared to cooperate. Information thus obtained should then be shared with the other Centers and Washington through the reports system described above. Customs' Significant Enforcement Activity Report and the Coast Guard's Situation Report are a step in this direction. A standardized system covering these and other agencies would bring benefits to all.

6. Trend Analysis -- Instruction on the production of trend analysis covering international trafficking would promote longer-term thinking about narcotics interdiction. Although more computerization and wider access to information would be beneficial, the new Centers initially will have to depend on more basic trend analysis -- they lack the computer access and the trained personnel to undertake highly sophisticated analysis.

7. Collection -- The Centers clearly need more information of all types. As recent detection successes in New Orleans showed, they would benefit from a steadier flow of information from AWACs and P-3s. New York, faced with a heroin interediction problem, needs more information from abroad on how and when shipments will be made. Long Beach lacks a steady source of special intelligence. None of the Centers receive much reporting from other Centers or from Washington, nor do they receive enough foreign tactical intelligence from components of US Missions abroad.

8. Recommended Training Package -- Training in the above-mentioned disciplines -- collation, requirements, trend analysis and reports systems -- should be tailored to the extent possible to the different set of problems confronting each Center. Trainers will need first to learn how a particular

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Center is handling intelligence and then adjust the training package accordingly. We do recommend, however, that standard formats be used for trend analysis and reports, since these products will be consumed by other Centers as well as by Washington. Training in collation techniques and requirements preparation can be more informal -- each Center should adopt a system with which it is comfortable.

Given the nature of the training requirement, at least one trainer should have had experience as a military analyst; another should have had experience in reports writing.

9. Other Recommendations

-- Some of the Centers are not sufficiently familiar with EPIC to use its resources. We believe that supervisors from the Centers should visit EPIC. EPIC should also designate one of its officers as contact point for all the Centers. He would be responsible for looking after the interests of the Centers and in particular for sending them information that he thinks they need.

-- Mother ships are increasingly using Canadian waters, yet the Canadian Maritime Force provides little information. Efforts should be made to improve coordination.

10. Comment -- The survey was conducted by the National Intelligence Officer for Narcotics, the SIGINT National Intelligence Officer for Narcotics, and a CIA current intelligence analyst. The team was uniformly impressed with the enthusiasm and motivation in the Centers. Much has been accomplished in a few short weeks. If we can capitalize on that enthusiasm by offering a sensible training package quickly, a useful result is likely.

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